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CONTRIBUTION AND REWARD  
OF SENIOR IT EXECUTIVES IN IT CAPABLE FIRMS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The number of academic studies, news articles, white papers, and books on IT strategic 
leadership has been growing for several years. The insight produced from the academic side 
highlights the positive role of senior IT executives (sITes) on various issues such as innovative 
and effective use of IT in the firm (Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1998; Leidner et al. 2010; Li et 
al. 2006), development of core IT capabilities (Feeny and Willcocks 1998), alignment between 
IT and business strategy (Chan et al. 2006), and firm’s ability to sustain its IT enabled 
competitive advantage (Dehning and Stratopoulos 2003). The success stories of sITes such as R. 
Mott at Wal-Mart, D. Busch at Intel, T. Shack at PNC, and T. Stanley at Harrah’s provide the 
anecdotal evidence to back these insights. Still this proliferation of academic and professional 
evidence has produced little insight on how to motivate sITes to make a significant and 
sustainable contribution to their firm’s quest for competitive advantage. The main objective of 
this study is to propose and test a pattern of positive reciprocity between sITes and firms with 
superior dynamic IT capability. More specifically we propose and test the following question: 
Are firms who reward their sITes for their contribution to their firm's ability to develop superior 
IT capability more likely to sustain their superiority? 
This question lies at the intersection of two streams of literature: IT strategic leadership 
and IT business value. A prescription that is emerging from the IT strategic leadership literature 
is that sITes must transition into enterprise leaders responsible and personally instrumental in 
envisioning their firm’s IT strategy and developing IT capabilities (Broadbent and Kitzis 2005; 
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Feeny and Willcocks 1998; Smaltz et al. 2006). The assumption that this prescription to sITes 
seems to take for granted is that firms appreciate and reward their sITes for their contribution. 
However, news stories such as the recent unceremonious departure of R. Mott from HP 
(Ricadela 2011) cast doubt to the validity of this assumption. Mott’s IT initiatives at HP 
improved productivity while saving $1 billion in IT costs (Murphy 2008). The academic side 
concurs that among incumbent sITes; the probability of promotion is slim (Applegate and Elam 
1992), dismissal rate is high (Applegate and Elam 1992; Chatterjee et al. 2001), and a high 
percentage of sITes were dismissed or left while they were perceived successful on their job 
(Leidner and Mackay 2007).  
Lack of support for the appreciation and reward assumption seems consistent with 
researchers reporting a boardroom ‘IT attention deficit’ (Huff et al. 2006) or lamenting that when 
it comes to IT, board members 'talk the talk but they don't walk the walk' (Corporate Board 
Member March/April 2007). Asked to evaluate the importance of the question "Has the 
responsibility for IT corporate governance been assigned to a person in sufficiently senior 
management position?" board members provided lukewarm results (Bart and Turel 2010). Career 
and motivation implications of these findings for sITes are particularly important since one of the 
roles that is typically ascribed to directors is control of the process by which executives are hired, 
promoted, assessed, and, if necessary, dismissed (Adams et al. 2010). Overall, it seems that the 
legitimacy of sITes has not been fully established in many organizations (Kaarst-Brown, 2005). 
Therefore, the assumption that their contribution is appreciated and rewarded should not be taken 
for granted. 
Meanwhile, the consensus emerging on the IT business value literature side is that 
dynamic IT capabilities are a source of competitive advantage (Bhatt and Grover 2005; Lim et al. 
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2012; Pavlou and El Sawy 2006; Zhu 2004). Recent empirical evidence has shown that dynamic 
organizational IT capability (ITC) is durably heterogeneous due to path dependence. That is, 
firms that have developed the ability to distinguish themselves from their competitors through 
ITC are more likely to repeat this in the future than firms lacking such experience (Lim et al. 
2012). Given that durable heterogeneity is the cornerstone of the resource-based view, and 
therefore critical in IT business value literature (Mata et al. 1995; Bharadwaj 2000; Lim et al. 
2012), a need and an opportunity arises to understand how to motivate sITes to contribute to the 
duration of ITC heterogeneity. 
This study introduces a causality-based framework of antecedents and consequences in 
order to examine the positive reciprocity between sITes and IT capable firms. More specifically 
we propose that: 1. There is a positive association between accrued sources of managerial power 
of sITes, such as structural and expert power, and a firm's ability to develop superior ITC.  2. 
Firms that achieve such ITC superiority are more likely to signal their appreciation and reward 
(promote) their sITes. 3. If sITes value this reward, they are more likely to stay longer with their 
firm. There is a positive association between continuity of an already successful IT leadership 
and a firm’s ability to sustain its ITC superiority (durable ITC heterogeneity). 
Results based on panel data of 1326 large US firms from a wide spectrum of industries 
over a 13-year period (1997-2009) support these propositions. More specifically we find that 
there is a positive association between the official title and number of titles of sITes and their 
firm’s ability to achieve ITC superiority. Firms that achieve such superiority are more likely to 
bestow higher titles or more titles upon their sITes. Such reward seems to be appreciated by 
successful sITes who tend to stay longer with their firms. This continuity in IT strategic 
leadership is positively associated with the firm’s ability to sustain its ITC superiority. 
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This study contributes to both the IT business value and IT strategic leadership literature.  
Our understanding of the role of sITes as well as antecedents and consequences of IT strategic 
leadership remains limited (Karahanna and Watson 2006). Prior research has relied either on 
anecdotal evidence or survey data (Karahanna and Watson 2006; Chen et al. 2010). The cross 
sectional design of survey studies, in particular, does not allow researchers to fully establish the 
causality between independent and dependent variables. That can be achieved with longitudinal 
studies (Preston et al. 2008). To the best of our knowledge this is the first study to use large-scale 
panel data in order to study antecedents and consequences of IT strategic leadership. Empirical 
evidence validates the position that firms that want to achieve and sustain ITC superiority 
(durable ITC heterogeneity) need to create an organizational climate of positive reciprocity. Such 
an organization climate can only be developed over time and there is no short cut that 
competitors can take in order to replicate it. That is, ITC is durably heterogeneous due not only 
to path-dependence (Lim et al. 2012) but also time-compression diseconomies. Overall, the most 
important finding of this study is not that ITC firms reward their sITes, as lack of such evidence 
would seem paradoxical. The most interesting finding is that rewarding their sITes creates the 
potential for sustainability of the firm’s ITC superiority! 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION AND HYPOTHESES 
Literature Review 
IT Strategic Leadership 
The IT strategic literature focuses on sITes (Karahanna and Watson 2006) and proposes an 
association between certain antecedents (e.g., management power, skills, and capabilities of 
sITes) and consequences (e.g., organizational role of IT or effectiveness of sITes). Management 
power is a critical antecedent for the IT strategic leadership literature. It has been described as an 
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‘elusive quality’ (Applegate and Elam 1992); it has been defined as the capacity of senior 
executives to exert their will, and it accrues to top managers who can cope with uncertainty and 
are uniquely positioned to do so (Finkelstein 1992). While there are several sources of 
management power (Finkelstein et al. 2009; Finkelstein 1992; Mintzberg 1983), IT strategic 
leadership research has focused on structural power (formal authority) and expert power 
(experience and expertise). Structural power is based on an executive’s position in the 
organizational hierarchy (formal title), and it increases with the number of different titles accrued 
to him/her (Finkelstein 1992; Hambrick 1981; Mintzberg 1983; Ocasio 1994). Structural power 
has been measured in IT strategic leadership literature by such proxies as sITe’s membership in 
the firm’s top management team (TMT), reporting structure, and managerial roles. Expert power 
is based on the executive’s relevant experience and expertise (Finkelstein 1992; Mintzberg 
1983). In IT strategic leadership literature, expert power has been measured by such proxies as 
years of IT or business related experience, tenure with the organization, and formal education 
(See Table 1-Column 1). 
Our review of antecedents in IT strategic literature reveals the following rather puzzling 
practice. In spite of overwhelming evidence that there is a plethora of titles associated with sITes 
(e.g., Banker et al. 2011, p. 489; Grover et al. 1993, p. 108; Karimi et al. 1996, p. 76; Armstrong 
and Sambamurthy 1999, p. 310), there seems to be a consensus of using the blanket title ‘CIO’ to 
describe all senior IT executives.1 However, this convenience driven simplification goes against 
the prevailing theoretical and professional insight. Title(s) of sITE are accrued and reflect IT 
management skills. In IT business value literature, IT management skills have been linked to a 
                                                
1 For example Banker et al. (2011) state that the “CIO is defined as the highest level IT executive or manager in a 
firm or business unit, even if the term CIO may not always be used.” Similarly, Grover et al. (1993; p. 108) accept 
that the title “CIO has been somewhat loosely defined and is often used interchangeably with various titles such as 
Information Technology (IT) Director, Vice President of IS, Director of Information Resources, and Director of IS, 
to describe a senior executive responsible for establishing policy and controlling information resources.”  
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firm’s ability to manage technical and market risks associated with IT investments (Bharadwaj 
2000; Mata et al. 1995), they are heterogeneously distributed among competing firms (Mata et 
al. 1995), and are a source of sustainable competitive advantage (Dehning and Stratopoulos 
2003). From a practical standpoint, the need to draw a distinction in terms of title(s) of sITes is 
corroborated by survey results showing that IT executives with multiple titles are among the 
highest paid sITes with compensation packages of $1 million or more (Marlin 2004). This 
convenience driven practice in the existing literature prompts the following question: Does the 
title or number of titles of sITes matter? 
The spectrum of consequences in IT strategic leadership literature can be described in 
terms of three concentric and expanding circles. The first one focuses on the individual level, and 
an association has been established between management power and sITes’ IT leadership styles, 
their latitude for strategic decision-making, and their perceived effectiveness. The second one 
focuses on the IT organization level. Studies have linked sITes’ management power to the role of 
IT within the organization, effective use, alignment between IT and business strategy, etc. The 
third circle finds a positive association between IT strategic leadership and financial as well as 
market measures of firm performance. Overall, research supports the position that sITes are 
instrumental for envisioning their firm’s IT strategy, developing IT capabilities, and adding value 
(See Table 1-Column 2). 
Notwithstanding the contribution of the existing IT strategic leadership literature, there is 
a conspicuous absence of reference to reward or appreciation for sITes for their contribution to 
their firm’s ability to achieve IT related objectives. While this is not explicitly stated, we 
speculate that there is an underlying assumption in IT strategic leadership literature that firms 
reward their sITes. However, according to several academic studies and professional sources, 
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turnover is high among sITes (job security is low), credibility of sITes has been on a roller 
coaster ride, and their legitimacy remains relatively low (Austin et al. 2009; Currier 2009; 
Kaarst-Brown 2005; Leidner and Mackay 2007; Schiller 2011). Given that individuals are 
motivated because they want to fulfill certain needs such as financial safety and esteem, this gap 
in existing literature motivates the following question: Are sITes appreciated and rewarded for 
their contribution to their firm’s ability to achieve IT related objectives? 
Durable Heterogeneity of IT Resources and Capabilities 
Resource-based view (RBV) and its extension dynamic capabilities perspective have provided 
the theoretical foundation of IT business value research (Wade and Hulland 2004; Zhu 2004). 
The premise of RBV is that certain resources and capabilities are heterogeneously distributed 
among competing firms; therefore they are a source of competitive advantage  [Barney 1991; 
Helfat and Peteraf 2003, Peteraf 1993). The duration of this resource heterogeneity (temporary or 
durable) determines the duration of the firm’s competitive advantage (temporary or sustainable) 
(Mata et al. 1995). Recent empirical evidence has shown that dynamic IT capability (ITC), 
defined as a firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure IT-enabled resources concurrently 
with organizational and managerial processes in order to align with a rapidly changing 
competitive environment, is durably heterogeneous due to path dependence (Lim et al. 2012). 
That is, firms that have developed the ability to distinguish themselves from their competitors 
through ITC are more likely to repeat this in the future than firms lacking such experience. In 
light of IT strategic leadership literature, these findings raise the following question: What is the 
role of sITes in their firm’s quest to achieve durable ITC heterogeneity? 
Durable ITC Heterogeneity and IT Strategic Leadership 
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A company’s quest to achieve and sustain ITC superiority is a continuous and incremental 
process. From an IT business value literature standpoint – described on the left side of Figure 1 – 
the process starts with an accumulation of flexible IT infrastructure, human IT skills, and 
complementary resources/processes; they form the foundation on which IT capability is built. 
Firms that have the ability to integrate IT based resources with improvements in complementary 
resources and business processes posses an organizational IT capability (Bharadwaj 2000). Firms 
with strong organizational learning capability can leverage feedback cycles of experience to 
build stronger or reconfigured IT capabilities (Bhatt and Grover 2005). An organizational IT 
capability that is aligned with the firm’s changing competitive environment is a dynamic 
organizational IT Capability (ITC) and firms that can resist competitors’ attempts to imitate or 
improve their ITC will achieve durable ITC heterogeneity (Lim et al. 2012). 
 
Figure 1. Sustainable ITC and IT Strategic Leadership 
 
From an IT strategic leadership standpoint – described on right side of Figure 1 - the 
quest for sustainable ITC superiority starts with a vision regarding the role of IT in the 
organization and proceeds with execution, i.e., accumulation and integration of appropriate IT 
based resources and processes as well organizational learning (Helfat and Peteraf 2003). 
Continuity of a successful IT leadership (i.e., continuity in vision and execution) will increase 
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the likelihood of transitioning from organizational IT capability to sustainable ITC superiority. 
The revelation that sustainable ITC superiority is a journey rather than a destination prompts the 
following question:  How can we motivate sITEs to ensure that they will continue contributing to 
their firm’s ability to achieve and sustain ITC superiority? 
Conceptual Research Framework and Research Hypotheses 
A synthesis between expectancy theory and reciprocity theory forms the foundation for studying 
the questions identified in our literature review. Expectancy theory, which was introduced by 
Vroom in his classic book on motivation (Vroom 1964), is built on the premise that an 
employee's performance is based on such attributes as knowledge, experience, and abilities. The 
theory proposes that motivation to perform is driven by employees' beliefs about expectancy 
(what they are capable of doing), instrumentality (performance related reward), and Valence 
(value they place upon the reward). Reciprocity is a new economic theory that complements 
expectancy theory in the sense that it introduces reciprocity as a motive, in addition to self-
interest (Fehr and Gachter 1998; 2000), and helps to address practical issues such as timing and 
form of reward, even when time and form of reward are not explicit (Deckop et al 2003). 
More specifically, reciprocity theory recognizes that the traditional economic assumption 
that labor is hired as a factor of production is not realistic since most of the labor contracts are 
not explicit in terms of effort and performance incentives. The absence of explicit performance 
incentives and discretion on employee effort reflect a rational decision, especially when dealing 
with employees, such as sITes, who are multitasking and operate in a dynamic environment 
(Fehr and Gachter 1998; 2000). Under these conditions, a sITe who contributes to his/her firm’s 
ITC may not receive an immediate reward, i.e., a reward above their fixed contract payment, but 
may earn a promotion or reward in the future. On the other hand, a firm may be willing to reward 
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a sITe now in order to increase his/her job satisfaction and job performance in the future. Akerlof 
(1980) describes this norm of reciprocity as a ‘gift exchange.’ Conditions of incomplete contracts 
render the norm of reciprocity an important part of organizational life (Deckop et al 2003; Fehr 
and Gachter 1998). Therefore, consistent with prior literature (Fehr and Gachter 1998; 2000), we 
speculate that under such conditions of incompletely specified obligations and weak or non-
existant explicit performance incentives, the attitude of sITes depends on the existence of a 
moral norm of positive reciprocity in the organization. More specifically, we propose the 
following synthesis (see Figure 2): 
First, we establish that sITes’ power contributes to their firm’s ability to develop superior 
ITC, i.e., achieve temporal ITC heterogeneity. This is consistent with the expectancy component 
in expectancy theory and represents a gift exchange in reciprocity theory. The sITes contribute to 
their firm’s ability to achieve ITC because there is an expectation that in the future there is going 
to be a reward even though time and form is not explicit. Second, top executives and board 
members of firms who value their firm’s ability to achieve ITC superiority are more likely to 
exhibit signs of appreciation and reward their sITes for their contribution. The manifestation of 
appreciation will be translated into job security as well as rewards (promotion) for the sITes. 
While the second step establishes that there is a subset of firms that see value in ITC and choose 
to reward their sITes for their contribution; it is the combination of the first and second step that 
ensures that the implicit contract/exchange between ITC firms and sITEs is governed by the 
moral norm of positive reciprocity. Third, if sITes value their reward then they will want to stay 
longer with their firm. Ensuring a continuity of an already successful IT leadership increases the 
likelihood that the firm will sustain its ITC superiority (enduring ITC heterogeneity). Firms that 
sustain their superiority are more likely to bestow more rewards and appreciation upon their 
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sITes. Thus, with the third step we establish the long-term effect of a cycle of positive 
reciprocity. 
 
Figure 2. Conceptual Framework 
 
The main message in this synthesis is that reciprocity represents a non-market clearing 
condition. If positive reciprocity is a clearing condition, i.e., all firms reward their sITes for their 
contribution to their firm’s ability to achieve ITC superiority, it confers no competitive 
advantage to any firm. However, the reciprocity norm implies a matching between the 
needs/motivation of sITes and the goals/capabilities of the firm.  Only the subset of firms that 
create the social norm of positive reciprocity will be able to achieve and sustain ITC superiority. 
Therefore, a culture of positive reciprocity is a source of sustainable competitive advantage. 
H1 - Ability to Contribute: IT strategic leadership literature provides ample support for 
linking structural and expert power of sITes to vision and execution. Senior IT executives with 
higher structural power are more likely to act as entrepreneurs (Grover et al. 1993), and to shape 
an organizational mission and vision geared towards a more strategic use of IT in their capacity 
as strategist and innovation catalyst (Smaltz et al. 2006; Raghunathan and Raghunathan 1989). 
More powerful sITes are more likely to succeed in promoting their vision among TMT members 
(Chatterjee et al. 2001) and justify the need for allocation of resources for strategic IT projects 
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(Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1999). Additionally, the accumulated knowledge and expertise 
(expert power) that sITes bring to their firm is expected to materialize in their ability to achieve 
firm specific objectives (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Smaltz et al. 2006). For example, 
executives' education has been related to their capacity to cope with complex problems and 
develop innovative strategic solutions (Geletknycz and Boyd 2011; Wally and Baum 1994; 
Wiersema and Bantel 1992). Hence, sITEs are likely to form positive expectations regarding 
their ability to contribute and be motivated to leverage their vision and execution capabilities in 
order to help their firm achieve ITC superiority Thus, we postulate:2 
H1a: Ceteris paribus, sITes with more structural power are more likely to contribute to 
their firm's ability to achieve ITC superiority than sITes with less structural power. 
H1b: Ceteris paribus, sITes with more expert power are more likely to contribute to their 
firm's ability to achieve ITC superiority than sITes with less expert power. 
 
H2 - Reward: Firms continually update their assessments of their non-CEO executives 
based on individual measures of performance and remove under-performers (Fee and Hadlock 
2004). Given the emerging consensus regarding the importance of dynamic IT capabilities (Bhatt 
and Grover 2005; Lim et al. 2012; Pavlou and El Sawy 2006; Zhu 2004) it is reasonable to 
assume that sITes will be evaluated in terms of their company’s ability to achieve ITC 
superiority. Senior IT executives who succeed are more likely to be retained and trusted in key 
decision-making processes (Chan et al. 2006; Preston et al. 2008) and those who fail are likely to 
lose their credibility with the TMT and their job (Leidner and Mackay 2007). Therefore, we 
propose that ITC firms are less likely to replace their sITes (lower turnover, higher job security) 
and more likely to reward (promote) them with more and higher formal titles (increase their 
                                                
2The conceptualization of durable ITC (i.e., it is built on a firm’s ability to sustain ITC) implies that achieving ITC 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for durable ITC heterogeneity. Therefore, the ‘ability to contribute’ 
hypothesis, also applies to durable ITC heterogeneity. As a robustness check we test the following hypothesis 
regarding attributes of senior IT executives and durable ITC heterogeneity: Ceteris paribus, sITes with more power, 
experience, expertise and tenure are more likely to contribute to their firm's ability to achieve and sustain ITC 
superiority than sITes with less power, experience, expertise, and tenure. 
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structural power). From the sITes' standpoint, we expect that success will increase their job 
satisfaction and they will be more inclined to stay with their current employer (Ghiselli et al. 
2001). Thus, we propose: 
H2a: Ceteris paribus, firms that achieve superior ITC are more likely to experience 
(provide) lower turnover of (higher job security to) their sITes than firms with no ITC 
superiority. 
H2b: Ceteris paribus, firms that achieve superior ITC are more likely to promote their 
sITes than firms with no ITC superiority. 
 
H3 - Culture of Positive Reciprocity: If sITes value their reward (valence) they are 
more likely to be committed and stay longer with their firm. A reward will be valued if it 
satisfies an important extrinsic or intrinsic want or need. Since a promotion (higher title or more 
titles) is associated with higher compensation (Marlin 2004) and higher structural power 
(Finkelstein 1992) it fulfills both the financial need and esteem need of sITEs. Therefore if 
reward and appreciation of sITes increases the likelihood of continuity in vision and execution of 
IT strategic leadership.  Given that many firms do not have plans in place to deal with departing 
sITes (Leidner and Mackay, 2007), this continuity of a successful IT strategic leadership sets 
apart firms that achieve and sustain ITC superiority (durable ITC heterogeneity) from firms that 
achieve but do not sustain ITC superiority (temporary ITC heterogeneity). Furthermore, given 
that durable ITC heterogeneity is a source of sustainable competitive advantage (Lim et al. 2012) 
and that in the spirit of positive reciprocity firms with superior and sustained ITC would 
subsequently bestow more reward on their sITes, the cycle of positive reciprocity is reinforced.3 
Therefore we postulate that: 
H3a:  Ceteris paribus, ITC firms that reward their sITes (higher title or more titles) are 
more likely to experience a continuity of IT strategic leadership than firms that do not 
reward their sITes. 
                                                
3 A counter argument is that the sITe will become complacent and will not be interested in further development of 
the ITC or resisting competitors attempts to replicate this ITC. What is holding them from becoming complacent is 
the threat of replacement (turnover) 
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H3b: Ceteris paribus, ITC firms that experience continuity in IT strategic leadership are 
more likely to achieve and sustain ITC superiority (durable ITC heterogeneity) than ITC 
firms that experience discontinuity in their IT strategic leadership. 
H3c: Ceteris paribus, firms that achieve and sustain ITC superiority are more are more 
likely to promote their sITes than firms that achieve but do not sustain ITC superiority. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Data set 
To test the positive reciprocity between the role of sITes and IT capable firms, we use all (1326) 
publicly traded firms that have appeared at least once in the list of InformationWeek 500 (IW500) 
from 1997 to 2009. Consistent with prior studies (Bharadwaj 2000; Santhanam et al. 2003; Lim 
et al. 2012) we treat the annual IW500 list as a proxy for firms that have achieved ITC 
superiority. To identify the role of sITes in our sample firms, we searched proxy statements, such 
as Form 10-Ks and DEF-14A from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In 
order to enhance the completeness and accuracy of our data, we also conducted a subsequent 
manual review of each sITe’s biographical information via Lexis-Nexis, as well as thirteen 
online information sources (Linkedin, Zoominfo People, Businessweek People, Forbes People 
Tracker, Reuters, Company Press Release, Company Annual Report, Evanta.com, 
Boardroominsiders.com, Mergent Online, Resource.Bnet.Com, Factiva, and Marketwatch). 
These sources also provide information about sITe’s title, background, tenure, compensation, 
and CV for each firm (1326) and for each year in the sample (1997-2009). 
Variables 
Structural Power: As a result of this data compilation, our sample includes 317 different 
official titles for sITes [e.g., Chief Information Officer (CIO), Chief Technology Officer (CTO), 
Sr. V.P. of Information Systems (IS)/Information Technology (IT)/Computing Information 
Systems (CIS)/Management Information Systems (MIS); V.P. of IS/IT/CIS/MIS; Dir. of 
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IS/IT/CIS/MIS; Exec. Dir. of IS/IT/CIS/MIS; Managing Director of IS/IT/CIS/MIS; Pres. Dir. of 
IS/IT/CIS/MIS, etc). Consistent with the extant literature (Finkelstein 1992), we identify sITes 
according to their official title as well as the number of titles. In assessing structural power for 
sITes we introduce the following classification: 1. sITes with the formal title of CIO plus 
additional official titles (e.g., CIO & Executive Vice President), 2. sITes with just the title of 
CIO, and 3. sITes without the CIO title (e.g., CTO or Managing director). For sake of simplicity, 
in the remainder of our discussion we refer to from the high power to low power group as 
CIOplus, CIO, and Non-CIO. 
Expert Power: While IT-related explicit knowledge enables IT managers to exhibit IT 
leadership and to leverage the business value of IT (Bassellier et al. 2001; 2003), academic 
education provides the declarative or explicit knowledge for IT expertise, whereas experience 
represents professional maturity (Kollmann et al. 2009). Over the years these individual sources 
of IT expert power are likely to complement each other in order to form a sITes cumulative 
expert power. Therefore, in this study we concentrate on the cumulative IT-related experience 
(CumITexp) as the complementary effect of an IT related academic degree (ACD), the prior IT-
related employment (ITEF), and the IT-related practical experience (ITfirm). This means that the 
number of individual sources is not as important as the fact that the sITe has some form of IT 
related expert power. A sITe with an ACD and ITEF and ITfirm has the same CumITexp as 
another with ACD and ITEF or just one of these firms of IT related expert power. 
Appreciation, Reward, and Continuity of IT strategic Leadership: We consider the change in 
sITe (TOit) as a form of organizational appreciation for IT as well as a sign of the sITe’s job 
satisfaction. The firm’s top management is not likely to replace the sITe if they are satisfied with 
his/her contribution and the firm’s sITe is not likely to want to leave the firm if his/her need for 
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esteem is satisfied. We introduce two forms of reward (promotion) in the context of this study. 
The first one (SPro|Sit) is defined as follows: +2=non-CIO to CIOPlus; +1=non-CIO to CIO or 
CIO to CIOPlus; 0=no change in title; -1=CIOPlus to CIO or CIO to non-CIO; -2=CIO Plus to 
non-CIO. Variable takes values in the range +2 to -2, and it is calculated only if Sit=1. The 
second one (WPro|Sit) is defined as follows: +1=from non-CIO to CIO or CIOPlus or from CIO 
to CIOPlus, as well as CIO to CIO or CIOPlus to CIOPlus; 0=non-CIO to non-CIO; -1=CIOPlus 
to CIO or CIO to non-CIO. Variable takes values in the range +1 to -1, and it is calculated only if 
Sit=1. Finally, the firm enjoys a continuity of IT strategic leadership (Con it) if the same sITe has 
been with the firm for the last four years. 
ITC and Durable ITC: Consistent with prior research (Chen et al. 2011; Lim et al. 2012) we 
use a firm’s recognition by IW500 as a proxy for ITC superiority (ITCit=1) and the cross-
sectional evolution of a firm’s recognition in IW500 over four-year rolling windows (e.g., 1997-
00, 1998-01, … , 2006-09) to classify firms in terms duration of their ITC superiority.4 More 
specifically, in each window we classify a firm as one that has achieved and sustained ITC 
superiority, i.e., achieved durable ITC heterogeneity (SYSit) if it has been recognized in IW500 
all years within the four-year rolling window. We classify a firm as one that has achieved but not 
sustained ITC superiority, i.e., non-durable ITC heterogeneity (OCCit) if the firm has appeared 
less than four times in IW500 within the four-year rolling window. Finally, we classify a firm as 
having no ITC superiority (NONit) if it has not been recognized in any of the four years. 
                                                
4 Prior research has shown that firms who achieve and sustain their ITC superiority over four consecutive years are 
more likely to sustain this superiority in the future due to path dependence (Lim et al. 2012) and more likely to 
recover from losses occurring during an economic downturn (Chen et al. 2011). The choice of four years in these 
studies (Chen et al. 2011; Lim et al. 2012) has been built on the following arguments: Firm-specific resources and 
capabilities tend to drive performance variations that last three to five years (Powell 2003); average IT-enabled 
advantage is five years (Dehning and Stratopoulos 2003); and four-year window coincides with the longest duration 
of an enduring IT capability in Bharadwaj (2000, p. 177). 
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Control Variables: Consistent with prior literature (Lim et al. 1012) we use firm size, firm 
performance, and reputation to account for extraneous sources of variation of ITC superiority.  
Firm size (Cheng 2005; Lev 1983), represents a firm’s ability to sustain a competitive advantage 
from its market power or positional advantages, as well as superior financial and human 
resources endowments (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996; Morrow et al. 2007; Roberts and Dowling 
2002). The need to control for the past performance (ROA) is twofold: (1) a firm’s strategic IT 
capability choice could be a function of its past performance (Santhanam and Hartono 2003), and 
(2) it is likely that the selection of firms with superior IT capability by industry experts might be 
influenced by the firm’s past performance (Bharadwaj 2000). A firm’s reputation might be 
another factor that may influence the selection of firms with superior IT capability by industry 
experts. Market-to-book-value (MV) has been suggested as a proxy for reputation because it 
captures tangible and intangible assets (Roberts and Dowling 2002), as well as the market’s 
expectations of future economic returns (Mueller 1990). 
Based on review of prior literature on strategic leadership and IT business value we chose 
concentration ratio (CRi) and Tobin’s q (TQit) to control for extraneous sources of executive 
appreciation/reward. The expected effect of CRi is ambivalent. According to mimetic 
isomorphism (Finkelstein et al. 2006; Rajagopalan and Datta 1996) the pressure will be higher to 
reward sITes for ITC superiority when the number of competitors is small (CRi is high). On the 
other hand, high CRi implies high visibility or peer recognition, which is detrimental to the firm’s 
ability to sustain its superiority (Dehning and Stratopoulos 2003), thus likely to have a negative 
effect on appreciation/reward of sITes. Given that typical IT benefits are intangible, TQit has 
been used as a performance proxy for examining the effect of IT investment (Bharadwaj et al. 
1999; Chari et al. 2008; Ravichandran et al. 2009), IT synergies (Tanriverdi 2006), and superior 
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IT capability (Masli et al. 2011). Overall, TQit is the kind of performance measure more likely to 
capture and reflect co-presence of such intangibles as good management skills (Adams et al. 
2010) and superior IT capability (Masli et al. 2011). 
Econometric model 
Testing sITes’ Ability to Contribute. The testing of H1a and H1b is based on the estimation of 
(1), an indicator function similar to the one in Lim et al. (2011), using the random-effect (RE) 
approach proposed by Wooldridge (2005). 𝐼𝑇𝐶!"   =   𝑓 𝐼𝑇𝐶!"!!, 𝑆𝑃!"!!,𝐶𝑢𝑚𝐼𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑝!"!!, 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸!"!!,𝑅𝑂𝐴!"!!,𝑀𝑉!"!!, 𝜂! ,𝜑! ,𝑢!"             (1)  
Where ITCit indicates firms that have achieved ITC superiority; SP is the measure of structural 
power; CumITExp represents expert power; and SIZE, ROA, and MV are the control variables. 
(Please see Table 1 Panel C for variable definitions). The remaining variables ηi, φt, and uit 
capture the fixed effects, time effects, and time-variant unobserved variables respectively. 
Additionally, uit is assumed to be uncorrelated with the vector of observable firm characteristics. 
Testing sITes’ Reward. The testing of H2a and H2b is based on the estimation of (2a) and (2b1, 
2b2) respectively. Please notice that this is a two-stage process, in which estimation of (1) is 
stage one. 𝑇𝑂!"!! = 𝑓   𝐼𝑇𝐶_ℎ𝑎𝑡!"  ,𝐶𝑅!" ,𝑇𝑄!" ,𝛼! ,𝜓! , 𝜀!"                                                                   (2a) 𝑆𝑃𝑟𝑜|𝑆!" = 𝑓   𝐼𝑇𝐶_ℎ𝑎𝑡!" ,𝐶𝑅!" ,𝑇𝑄!" , 𝜆! ,𝜗! ,𝜔!"                                                           (2b1) 𝑊𝑃𝑟𝑜|𝑆!" = 𝑓   𝐼𝑇𝐶_ℎ𝑎𝑡!" ,𝐶𝑅!" ,𝑇𝑄!" , 𝜆! ,𝜗! ,𝜔!"                                                         (2b2) 
Where TOit captures sITes Turnover and SPro|Sit as well as WPro|Sit capture two measures of 
reward offered to sITes. ITC_hatit is the predicted ITC value based on estimation of (1) and CRit 
as well as TQit are two control variables. The variables 𝛼! and 𝜆! capture the fixed effects; 𝜓! and 𝜗! the time effects; and 𝜀!" and 𝜔!" the time-variant unobserved variables. It is assumed that 𝜀!" 
and 𝜔!"are uncorrelated with their respective vectors of observable firm characteristics. To 
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account for the possible endogeneity bias in the estimation of (2a) and (2b1, 2b2) we employ a 
two-stage estimation with correlated error terms, i.e., 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜀!" ,𝜔!") ≠ 0, and fixed firm effects 
(proxied by firm dummies) are included in the specification to control for unobservable firm 
characteristics. 
Testing Reciprocity between ITC firms and sITes. The testing of H3a-c is based on the 
estimation of (3a-3c). This system of simultaneous equations allows the endogeneity effect to be 
incorporated through correlation among the equations error terms by treating the three equations 
as a system. This system is estimated by a full information maximum likelihood (FIML) method. 𝐶𝑜𝑛!" = 𝑓   𝑆𝑃𝑟𝑜|𝑆!"!!,𝐶𝑅!" ,𝑇𝑄!" , 𝛾! , 𝛿! , 𝜖!"                                                                                                             (3a) 𝐼𝑇𝐶!"   =   𝑓 𝑆𝑌𝑆𝑣𝑂𝐶𝐶!"!!,𝐶𝑜𝑛!"!!, 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸!"!!,𝑅𝑂𝐴!"!!,𝑀𝑉!"!!, 𝜁! , 𝜅! , 𝜐!"             (3𝑏)  𝑆𝑃𝑟𝑜|𝑆!" = 𝑓 𝑆𝑌𝑆𝑣𝑂𝐶𝐶!"!!,𝐶𝑅!" ,𝑇𝑄!" , 𝜉! , 𝜏! , 𝑣!"                                                                                           (3𝑐)  
Where SYSvsOCCit lets us contrast SYS versus OCC firms; Conit is the measure of continuity in 
IT leadership, and SIZE, ROA, and MV are the control variables. The variables 𝛾!, 𝜁!, and 𝜉! 
capture the fixed effects; 𝛿!, 𝜅!, and 𝜏! the time effects; and 𝜖!", 𝜐!", and 𝑣!" the time-variant 
unobserved variables. It is assumed that 𝜖!", 𝜐!", and 𝑣!" are uncorrelated with their respective 
vectors of observable firm characteristics. To account for the possible endogeneity bias, the three 
equations are estimated as a system correlated error terms, i.e., 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜖!" , 𝜐!" , 𝑣!") ≠ 0, and fixed 
firm effects (proxied by firm dummies) are included in the specification to control for 
unobservable firm characteristics. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
Contrasting the distribution of formal titles and number of titles between ITC and non-ITC firms 
reveals what seems to be a ‘move in the middle’ approach (see Table 2 - panel A). This is 
reflected as a rising trend in the number of sITes with the formal title of just CIO. While this 
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trend is relatively more stable among non-ITC firms, it becomes more prevalent among ITC 
firms after the dot com crash. This move in the middle type of approach among ITC firms is 
paralled by a decline in the ranks of sITes that have the title of CIO plus other titles, and the 
group of sITes without the CIO title. We speculate that this may reflect an attitude among 
directors and top management teams that while IT is ubiquitous it is not necessarily a strategic 
priority among all firms. Thus it is not justifiable to assign the highest level of structural power 
to sITes. This is consistent with the RBV view that formal title(s) are accrued and reflect 
heterogeneously distributed IT management skills. 
 Contrasting firms in terms of the duration of their ITC heterogeneity (SYS = durable, 
OCC = non-durable, and NON = non-ITC) and looking at the continuity of IT leadership is a 
critical component of this study (see Table 2 - Panel B). As we were expecting, the probability of 
continuity in the firm’s IT leadership, i.e., the same sITe stays with the firm for four consecutive 
years, is the highest among the group of firms that achieve and sustain their ITC superiority 
(SYS). This is important given prior research that has shown the average tenure of an sITe to be 
less than 3 years (Leidner and Mackay 2007).  
Econometric results 
In order to validate the role of sITes’ formal title and number of titles (structural power) on their 
firm’s ability to achieve ITC superiority (H1a), we consider the following three scenarios: First, 
we contrast CIOplus or CIO versus non-CIO (SP1). Second, we contrast CIOplus versus CIO or 
non-CIO (SP2). Third, we contrast CIOplus versus CIO (SP3). Results based on all three 
specifications of structural power, reported in Table 3 - Panel A, support H1a. More specifically, 
the coefficient for all three specifications is positive and statistically significant (p-value<.05), 
ranging from .11 to .13. This means that an increase in the structural power of an sITe (higher 
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formal title or number of titles) in the prior period increases the probability that the firm will 
achieve ITC superiority by 11 to 13%. 
 Results related to expert power, the second component of management power and the 
focus of H1b reported on Table 3 - Panel A, strongly support the importance of sITes’ expert 
power on their firm’s ability to achieve ITC superiority. For the testing of the sITe’s expert 
power we consider various sources of experience and expertise, such as prior IT management 
experience or prior experience in an IT related firm/industry or IT related education, as being 
complementary to each other and forming an aggregate level of sITe’s expert power 
(ITCumExp). The contribution of sITe’s expert power to his/her firm’s ability to achieve ITC 
superiority is positive (ITCumExp coefficient ranges from 23.5% to 29.2%) and statistically 
significant (p-value<0.05) in all three specifications of structural power. While not an explicit 
hypothesis in the context of this study, results reported in Table 3 are consistent with the findings 
of Lim et al. (2011) regarding the path dependence of ITC. The coefficient of lagged ITC (ITCit-
1) is positive (ranges from 20.4% to 23.8%) and statistically significant (p-value<0.05). 
 The robustness of the aggregate form of expert power (CumITExp) based results, 
prompted the testing of the individual attributes of sITe’s expert power. Results shown in Table 3 
- Panel B remain unchanged with respect to the role of structural power (coefficient of SP1, SP2, 
and SP3 remain positive and significant), however the individual components of sITes’ expert 
power (AcDeg, ITBef, and ITFirm) as well as the effect of sITes’ number of years with the firm 
(Tenure) are either insignificant or marginally significant. These results indicate that while 
sITes’ expertise can be attributed to multiple sources, there is no single value, which appears to 
be more important than the others. 
	   22	  
 Empirical evidence reported in Table 4 validates our position that ITC firms offer higher 
job security (lower turnover) to their sITes (H2a) and are more likely to promote them (reward 
them with more and/or higher titles) than non-ITC firms (H2b). The coefficient of 𝐼𝑇𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑡!" in 
(2a) is negative (-0.268) and statistically significant (p-value<0.05). This means that the 
likelihood that an ITC firm will experience sITe turnover is 26.8% lower than that of a non-ITC 
firm.  The 𝐼𝑇𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑡!" coefficient in (2b1) and (2b2) is positive (0.287 and 0.304 respectively) and 
statistically significant (p-value<0.05). This means that the likelihood that an ITC firm will 
reward its sITe with a higher formal title and/or more titles is more than 29-30% higher than 
non-ITC firms. 
 Having established that management power contributes to ITC superiority (H1a and H1b) 
and that ITC firms are more likely to appreciate and reward their sITes (H2a and H2b), next we 
examined the three aspects of the reciprocity cycle on durable ITC heterogeneity: effect of 
promotion on continuity of IT strategic leadership (H3a); effect of continuity of IT strategic 
leadership in a firm’s ability to sustain its ITC superiority (H3b); and the effect of sustained ITC 
superiority on future reward of sITEs (H3c). The results are shown on Table 5 and they support 
our positions. The estimated coefficient of 𝑆𝑃𝑟𝑜|𝑆!"!! in (3a) is positive (.335) and statistically 
significant (p-value<5%). This means that the probability that a successful sITe that has been 
promoted will continue with his/her firm is 33.5% higher than his/her counterpart who did not 
receive such a reward. The coefficient of 𝐶𝑜𝑛!"!! in (3b) is positive (.152) and statistically 
significant (p-value<1%). Therefore the probability that a 𝑆𝑌𝑆!"!! firm that enjoys continuity in 
its IT strategic leadership will sustain its ITC superiority is 15% higher than another 𝑆𝑌𝑆!"!! 
firm that had a discontinuity in its IT leadership. Finally, the coefficient of 𝑆𝑌𝑆𝑣𝑂𝐶𝐶!"!! in (3c) 
is positive (0.317) and statistically significant (p-value<1%). Therefore the probability that a 
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sITe working for a 𝑆𝑌𝑆!"!! firm will be bestowed with a higher title or more titles is 31.7% 
higher than that of a sITe working for an a 𝑂𝐶𝐶!"!! firm. 
Robustness checks 
A barrage of robustness checks, several of them un-tabulated for brevity, ensures that our results 
are not sensitive to methodological choices. All robustness checks reliably generate results, 
which are consistent with the propositions of this study. The conceptualization of durable ITC 
implies that achieving ITC is necessary but not a sufficient condition for durable ITC 
heterogeneity. Therefore, the ‘ability to contribute’ hypothesis (H1a and H1b) also applies to 
durable ITC heterogeneity. As a robustness check we test the following hypothesis:  sITes with 
more structural and expert power are more likely to contribute to their firm's ability to achieve 
and sustain ITC superiority than sITes with less structural and expert power. We test this by 
using duration of ITC heterogeneity as our dependent variable (SYSvsOCCIT and OCCvsNONIT).  
Results reported on Table 6 show (Dep.Var: SYSvsOCCIT) support our position that 
management power contributes to a firm’s ability to achieve and sustain its ITC superiority. All 
three specifications of structural power are positive (SP1=0.105, SP2=0.127, and SP3=0.109) 
and statistically significant (p-value<0.05).  Similarly, the CumITExp is positive (25.7% to 
31.6%) and significant (p-value<0.05) in all three specifications of structural power. Replicating 
the analysis with OCCvsNONIT shows that the role of management power is only marginally 
significant. This is consistent with the argument presented in Lim et al. (2011) that the group of 
OCC firms may include firms that want to achieve ITC superiority only in certain periods as well 
as firms that achieve but cannot sustain their ITC superiority. The role of management power 
may be strong in the former but weak in the latter. Replicating the above tests with individual 
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components of sITes’ expert power (not tabulated) confirms our previous finding that individual 
components of sITes’ expert power are not as important.  
As an additional robustness check for the reward hypothesis (H2b) we consider the 
additional constraint that the person who is rewarded has to be the same one that helped the firm 
achieve its ITC superiority (Table 7). We did this by estimating the following specifications of 
(2b1) and (2b2): SPro|SNCit =f (ITC_hatit, CRit, TQit) and WPro|SNCit =f (ITC_hatit, CRit, 
TQit), where SPro|SNCit is the IT executive promoted or demoted (given same name & non-
ITC)? Variable takes values in the range +2 to -2. WPro|SNCit is the IT executive promoted or 
demoted (given same name & non-ITC)? Variable takes values in the range +1 to -1. The 
ITC_hatit coefficients are positive (0.315 and 0.323 respectively) and statistically significant (p-
value<5%). This means that the likelihood that an ITC firm will reward its sITe with a higher 
formal title and/or more titles is 31.5% and 32.3% respectively.  
As a robustness check for H3b we re-run the econometric analysis with SYSvOCC as our 
dependent variable. Results tabulated on table 8 remain significant and support the reciprocity 
propositions. Finally and consistent with Lim et al. (2011) we considered different proxies as 
well as alternative measurements for some of the control variables and untabulated results 
remain unchanged. 
DISCUSSION 
Key Findings: In spite of the importance of rewards as a motivation factor, the strategic IT 
leadership literature is peppered with references to punishment (Applegate and Elam 1992; 
Chatterjee et al. 2001; Leidner and Mackay 2007) rather than rewards. Given that sITes are 
personally instrumental in envisioning their firm’s IT strategy and developing IT capabilities, 
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this study introduced reciprocity between sITes and IT capable firms as a source of sustainable 
ITC superiority. 
Managerial IT skills are very important but they tend to be tacit. In this study we used 
structural and expert power in order to proxy the role superior IT management skills on ITC. Our 
evidence shows that both of them are important. According to our study sITes endowed with 
more and higher formal titles are likely to be more successful in their quest to help their firm 
develop superior IT capability. Given that sITes are individual motivated by the need for 
financial safety and esteem, we hypothesized that IT capable firms are more likely to reward 
their sITes for their contribution. Evidence based results clearly support our position that sITes 
of IT capable firms enjoy higher job security (lower turnover) and are rewarded with more and 
higher formal titles. This is very important given that there is a positive correlation between 
number of titles of sITes and their compensation. The main message from the second set is that 
there is heterogeneity in terms of the way firms reward or not reward their sITes. Given that 
reward and job security (lower turnover) are indications of how valuable IT management skills 
are to the firm's top management team and an indication of the inclusion of the sITes to the inner 
circle, these results provide the causal validation that could not be generated by prior studies 
based on cross sectional data sets. 
Given the hyper-competitive nature of the modern corporate landscape, a firm’s ability to 
develop superior IT capability is necessary but not sufficient condition for firms that want to 
obtain a sustainable competitive advantage. Firms that want to achieve IT enabled and sustained 
competitive advantage must evolve their IT capability and resist competitors’ attempt to copy or 
improve their superior IT capability. The main message here is that continuity of IT leadership 
matters, and given that for many firms there is no provision for such continuity, firms that 
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nurture this continuity of successful IT leadership will enjoy the benefits of durable ITC 
heterogeneity.  
Practical Implications: We can divide the practical implications of this study according to the 
stakeholder involved. In this study we recognize two stakeholders. 1. The firms top management 
team and board members. 2. sITes. Not all firms see the importance of developing superior ITC. 
Firms who see the importance of achieving and sustaining ITC superiority, will reward their 
sITes because this reward leads to continuity of IT leadership. Therefore top management teams 
and directors who want to achieve and sustain an IT enabled competitive advantage need to 
foster a culture of reciprocity with their sITes. Developing such a culture of trust and reciprocity 
is a long-term endeavor. The empirical evidence from our study indicates that increasing the 
power of sITes seems to be a kind of reward that is valued by sITes and it increases the chances 
that the sITes will help the firms develop and sustain its ITC superiority. The most important part 
is not that ITC firms reward their sITes, as lack of such evidence would seem paradoxical. The 
most interesting finding is that rewarding their sITes creates the potential for sustainability of the 
firm’s ITC superiority. 
Theoretical Implications: The results of our study indicate that titles matter and consistent with 
RBV could be treated as a proxy for different IT management power. This offers a new venue for 
the IT strategic leadership literature which has focused primarily on sITes membership to his/her 
firms top management team (TMT) and found that this may not be the right path for sITes.  “ ... 
TMT/CIO engagements alone do not directly impact CIO role effectiveness. Rather, CIO 
capability may mediate the relationship between TMT/CIO engagements and CIO role 
effectiveness. In other words, though TMT/CIO engagements might be a necessary condition for 
CIO role effectiveness, they are not sufficient” (Smaltz et al. 2006; p. 220). Our study found 
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evidence that structural power measured by a relatively easier to measure and more readily 
available proxy provides robust evidence regarding the role of sITes on their firm’s ability to 
achieve and sustain its ITC superiority. 
This study contributes to the literature on dynamic capabilities by identifying a 
foundation upon which strategic management builds, maintains, and enhances distinctive and 
difficult-to-replicate advantages (Teece et al. 1997). Our conceptual framework proposes and 
empirical analysis validates that creating a culture of reciprocity, the foundation for enduring 
ITC heterogeneity, is an incremental and time-consuming process refined after several iterations. 
Therefore, ITC is durably heterogeneous due to path-dependence (Lim et al. 2012) as well as due 
to time compression diseconomies. This is consistent with the view that the capabilities approach 
which sees “value augmenting strategic change as being difficult and costly. Moreover, it can 
generally only occur incrementally. Capabilities cannot easily be bought; they must be built. 
From the capabilities perspective, strategy involves choosing among and committing to long-
term paths or trajectories of competence development” (Teece et al. 1997; p. 529). 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research: Like all studies, there are limitations that 
we must acknowledge. First, since InformationWeek has been a well respected and widely used 
source of secondary information on IT capability (Bharadwaj, 2000; Santhanam and Hartono, 
2003), it was assumed that firms listed in IW500 are a proxy for firms with superior IT 
capability. However, we cannot confirm that the IW500 firms are independently evaluated each 
year. Second, Finkelstein (1992) suggests that official title, number of titles, and compensation 
are a proxy of hierarchical power. While we use official title and number of titles, compensation 
was excluded because in spite of our herculean efforts, we were unable to find enough data 
points to complete a meaningful statistical analysis. As a matter of fact we could find 
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compensation data for 2 to 3% of the total number of firms in each year. Nevertheless, since 
survey data have shown that sITes with multiple titles are among the highest paid sITes (Marlin 
2004), we feel confident that this limitation does not seem to compromise the main message of 
our study. We hope that our work will inspire researchers to come with better and more creative 
ways in order to shed more light on role of structural and expert power of senior IT executives. 
We hope that future research will build on our approach in order to explore other areas 
such as; Is there an association between the sustainability of a firm’s capability to innovate with 
IT and the firm’s competitive agility (i.e., ability to launch tactical and strategic movements). 
Does the complementarity of experience and expertise in a firm’s top management team (senior 
business and senior IT executives) affect the likelihood that the firm will reward its senior IT 
executives? Does the complementarity of experience and expertise in a firm’s top management 
team (senior business and senior IT executives) affect the sustainability of a firm’s capability to 
innovate with IT and its competitive agility? 
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Table 1. IT Strategic Leadership: Antecedents and Consequences 
Antecedents Consequences 
  sITes Structural Power 
- Member of TMT (Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1999; 
Chen et al. 2010; Earl and Feeny 1994; Feeny et al. 
1992; Kearns and Lederer 2003; Preston et al. 2008) 
- Reporting structure/distance from CEO (Armstrong and 
Sambamurthy 1999; Banker et al. 2011; Chen et al. 
2010; Kearns and Lederer 2003; Karimi et al. 1996; 
Preston et al. 2008; Raghunathan and Raghunathan 
1989; Smaltz et al. 2006) 
- Political smartness - ability to negotiate and influence 
TMT members (Broadbent and Kitzis 2005; Feeny et al. 
1992; Smaltz et al. 2006) 
- Ability to communicate in business terms with TMT 
members (Broadbent and Kitzis 2005; Feeny et al. 1992; 
Smaltz et al. 2006) 
- Credibility within TMT (Broadbent and Kitzis 2005) 
networking and trust with TMT members (Smaltz et al. 
2006) 
- sITe’s vision on how IT and can take the enterprise to 
the next level (Broadbent and Kitzis 2005) 
- Managerial roles/qualities of sITes such as 
spokesperson, monitor, entrepreneur (Grover et al. 1993) 
 
  sITes Expert Power 
- sITes’ tenure with current organization (Chen et al. 
2010; ) 
- sITes’ years of IT related experience (Chen et al. 2010; 
Earl and Feeny 1994; Feeny and Willcocks 1998) 
- level of education (Chen et al. 2010; Li et al. 2006) 
- sITes’ IT related knowledge (Armstrong and 
Sambamurthy 1999; Boynton et al. 1994; Chan et al. 
2006; Earl and Feeny 1994; Feeny and Willcocks 1998; 
Smaltz et al. 2006) 
- sITes’ business related knowledge (Armstrong and 
Sambamurthy 1999; Boynton et al. 1994; Chan et al. 
2006; Feeny et al. 1992; Feeny and Willcocks 1998; 
Smaltz et al. 2006) 
- sITes have an IS function analyst experience (Earl and 
Feeny 1994) 
 sITes 
- sITe’s strategic making authority within the 
organization (Preston et al. 2008) 
- Supply (cost/efficiency) or demand (innovation and 
strategic opportunities) oriented IT leadership focus 
(Chen et al. 2010) 
- Effectiveness as this is assessed by TMT in the context 
of salient roles, behaviors, and responsibilities (Smaltz et 
al. 2006) 
 
  IT Organization 
- Role of IT within an organization: operational or 
strategic (Boynton et al. 1994; Raghunathan and 
Raghunathan 1989) 
-  Innovative use of IT (Leidner et al. 2010; Li et al. 
2006) 
- Effective application of IT in supporting, shaping, and 
enabling firm’s business strategies and value-chain 
activities (Armstrong and Sambamurthy 1999) 
- IS maturity, implies strategic IS planning and 
alignment between IS and business strategy (Grover et 
al. 1993) 
- Alignment between IS and business strategy (Chan et 
al. 2006; Kearns and Lederer 2003) 
- Business/IS relationship, proxied by CEO/CIO 
relationship (Feeny et al. 1992) 
 - Developing and achieving core IS capabilities (Feeny 
and Willcocks 1998) 
- acceptance of IS planning, resources provided, top 
management support, links to organizational concerns 
(Raghunathan and Raghunathan 1989) 
 
  Firm 
- Financial or market performance implications (Banker 
et al. 2011; Chatterjee et al. 2001; Chen et al. 2010; Lim 
et al. 2012b; Preston et al. 2008) 
 
Notes: (a).  The reference to structural power of sITes in the study of Kearns and Lederer (2003) is 
implicit. (b) The direction of the association in Grover et al. (1993) and in Karimi et al. (1996) is from 
firm to sITe’s attributes. In Grover et al. 1993 is from IT organization characteristics to sITes’ managerial 
roles and in Karimi et al. 1996 is from business strategy to sITe’s structural power. (c) Smaltz et al. 
(2006; p. 211) define CIO capability as the interpersonal skills and knowledge, including: political savvy, 
communicative ability, strategic business knowledge; and strategic IT knowledge. 
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Table 2. Sample (N=1,326) 
Panel A: Distribution of Sample by Year 
Year 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 
              
ITC 448 448 421 422 409 416 410 399 334 320 325 338 303 
Missing  (33) (6) (1) (2) (2) (6) (3) (3) (20) (19) (19) (6) (5) 
CIOplus 78 131 131 117 67 51 46 42 42 54 66 68 57 
CIO 108 144 152 190 235 245 264 250 202 179 178 193 183 
non-CIO 229 167 137 113 105 114 97 104 70 68 62 71 58 
Total 415 442 420 420 407 410 407 396 314 301 306 332 298 
              
NonITC 878 878 905 904 917 910 916 927 992 1,006 1,001 988 1023 
Missing  (596) (556) (516) (477) (463) (449) (442) (429) (404) (429) (440) (458) (608) 
CIOplus 62 65 78 87 77 80 85 92 110 99 91 81 69 
CIO 111 124 164 193 216 232 238 266 337 338 336 333 257 
non-CIO 109 133 147 147 161 149 151 140 141 140 134 116 89 
Total 282 322 389 427 454 461 474 498 588 577 561 530 415 
 
Panel B: Distribution of Sample by Continuity 
  4-Year Rolling Window 
Year 9700 9801 9902 0003 0104 0205 0306 0407 0508 0609 
           
SYS 96 148 147 194 194 134 115 114 132 120 
Con = 1 46 76 80 102 106 82 65 63 58 54 
           
OCC 764 615 604 482 473 576 579 562 455 455 
Con = 1 185 152 178 187 224 264 258 234 186 205 
           
NonITC 466 563 575 650 659 616 632 650 739 751 
Con = 1 90 119 135 178 181 168 170 181 227 216 
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Panel C: Variable Description 
Variable Description 
ITCit 1 if a firm has achieved ITC superiority in year t; otherwise 0. 
SYSit 1 if a firm has achieved and sustained ITC superiority over a four-year window ending 
in year t (durable ITC heterogeneity); otherwise 0. 
OCCit 1 if a firm has achieved but not sustained ITC superiority over a four-year window 
ending in year t (non-durable ITC heterogeneity); otherwise 0. 
NONit 1 if a firm has not achieved ITC superiority in any of the year of a four-year window 
ending in year t (non-ITC); otherwise 0. 
CIOplus 1 if a sITe has the formal title of CIO plus additional official titles; otherwise 0. 
CIO 1 if a sITe has just the title of CIO; otherwise 0. 
non-CIO 1 if the title of a sITe does not include the moniker ‘CIO’; otherwise 0. 
SP1 1 if title is CIO Plus or just CIO; 0 if title is non-CIO. 
SP2 1 if title is CIO Plus; 0 if title is just CIO or non-CIO. 
SP3 1 if title is CIO Plus; 0 if title is just CIO. 
ACDeg it-1 1 if 1 if the IT executive had IT-related academic degree; otherwise 0. 
ITBef it-1 1 if 1 if the IT executive had experienced as the IT executive(s) from his/her previous 
employment; otherwise 0. 
ITfirm it-1 1 if 1 if the IT executive had IT-related practical experience and/or worked for IT 
firm(s); otherwise 0. 
Tenureit-1 number of years he/she has been IT executive(s) in the firm 
CumITexp 1 if the sITe had IT-related academic degree or prior IT executive experience or IT-
related practical experience or worked for IT firm(s); otherwise 0. 
TOit 1 if there is a change in the firm’s sITe from t to t+1; otherwise 0 
Sit 1 if sITe has been with the firm for the last three years. 
SPro|Sit +2=non-CIO to CIOPlus; +1=non-CIO to CIO or CIO to CIO Plus; 0=no change in 
title; -1=CIOPlus to CIO or CIO to non-CIO; -2=CIO Plus to non-CIO. Variable takes 
values in the range +2 to -2, and it is calculated only if Sit=1 
WPro|Sit +1=from non-CIO to CIO or CIOPlus or from CIO to CIOPlus, as well as CIO to CIO 
or CIOPlus to CIOPlus; 0=non-CIO to non-CIO; -1=CIOPlus to CIO or CIO to non-
CIO. Variable takes values in the range +1 to -1, and it is calculated only if Sit=1 
Con it-1 1 if the same sITe been with the firm for the last four years; otherwise 0. 
SIZEit-1 A natural log of total assets. 
ROAit-1 Return on assets. 
MVit-1 Market-to-book-value. 
CRit Concentration ratio as the annual sales revenues for the four largest firms in each four-
digit SIC code divided by the sales for all firms in the industry. (Banker et al. 2011) 
TQit Tobin’s Q a ratio of market value [(fiscal year-end market value of equity) + 
(liquidating value of the firms’ outstanding preferred stock) + (current liabilities) – 
(current assets) + (book value of inventories) + (long-term debt)] to book value of total 
assets. (Chung and Pruitt 1994) 
Industry Fixed industry effect. 
Year Fixed year effect. 
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Table 3. Attributes of Senior IT Executives and ITC Heterogeneity (H1a &H1b) 
Panel A Dep.Var:  ITCit 
 Coeff.(std.) Sig. Coeff.(std.) Sig. Coeff.(std.) Sig. 
ITCit -1 0.204 (0.093) ** 0.238 (0.095) ** 0.227 (0.086) *** 
SP1it-1 0.107 (0.045) **     
SP2it-1   0.130 (0.048) ***   
SP3it-1     0.125 (0.050) ** 
CumITexpit-1  0.235 (0.119) ** 0.292 (0.139) ** 0.263 (0.132) ** 
SIZEit-1 0.091 (0.053) * 0.116 (0.059) ** 0.111 (0.059) * 
ROAit-1 0.052 (0.028) * 0.032 (0.018) * 0.036 (0.019) * 
MVit-1 0.044 (0.027)  0.048 (0.026) * 0.052 (0.027) * 
ITCi0 0.368 (0.186) ** 0.335 (0.160) ** 0.342 (0.163) ** 
Industry Included   Included   Included  
Year Included   Included   Included  
  
0.312  
(0.137) 
** 0.286  
(0.129) 
** 0.292 (0.132) ** 
Ln L -1073.5    -995.9    -1025.3  
Wald1 0.023 ** 0.015 ** 0.019 ** 
Wald2 0.046 ** 0.028 ** 0.031 ** 
# Obs 9,184  9,184  9,184  
 
Panel B Dep.Var:  ITCit 
 Coeff.(std.) Sig. Coeff.(std.) Sig. Coeff.(std.) Sig. 
ITCit -1 0.215 (0.090)  ** 0.246 (0.085)  *** 0.233 (0.089)  *** 
SP1it-1 0.111 (0.049)  **     
SP2it-1   0.125 (0.042) ***   
SP3it-1     0.116 (0.047) ** 
ACDeg it-1 0.066 (0.034)  * 0.083 (0.044)  * 0.072 (0.038)  * 
ITBef it-1 0.077 (0.041)  * 0.074 (0.045)  0.068 (0.042)  
ITfirm it-1 0.072 (0.044)  0.079 (0.047)  * 0.066 (0.036)  * 
Tenureit-1 0.075 (0.039)  * 0.070 (0.042)  * 0.069 (0.034)  * 
SIZEit-1 0.116 (0.064)  * 0.112 (0.053)  ** 0.108 (0.055)  * 
ROAit-1 0.025 (0.014)   * 0.021 (0.012)  * 0.031 (0.016)   * 
MVit-1 0.033 (0.020)  0.053 (0.030)  * 0.047 (0.025)  * 
ITCi0 0.322 (0.129) ** 0.343 (0.146)  ** 0.319 (0.128)  ** 
 Industry Included  Included  Included  
 Year Included   Included   Included  
  
0.329 (0.124)  ** 0.292 (0.130)  ** 0.313 (0.125)  ** 
 Ln L -1202.2   -1012.6   -1055.3  
 Wald1 0.039 ** 0.036  ** 0.034  ** 
 Wald2 0.016  ** 0.019  ** 0.017  ** 
# Obs 9,184  9,184  9,184  
Note. Variables Defined in Panel C of Table 1. Wald1 records the p-value of the Wald test for the joint 
exclusion of year effects. Wald2 records the p-value of the Wald test for the joint exclusion of industry 
effects. The asterisks *, **, and *** respectively denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels for two-
sided alternatives.  
ησ
ησ
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Table 4. Firms with Superior ITC and Reward of sITes 
 H2a H2b  
 Dep.Var:  
 
Dep.Var:  
 
Dep.Var:  
SPro|Sit 
 Dep.Var: 
WPro|Sit  
 
 Coeff.(std.) Sig. Coeff.(std.) Sig. Coeff.(std.) Sig. 
CRit  0.108 (0.054) ** 0.126 (0.063) ** 0.153 (0.069) ** 
TQit -0.231 (0.112) ** 0.253 (0.114) ** 0.279 (0.146) ** 
ITC_hatit -0.268 (0.134) ** 0.287 (0.144) ** 0.304 (0.153) ** 
Industry Included  Included   Included  
Year Included  Included   Included  
Wald1 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Wald2 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Adj. R2 0.62  0.67  0.73  
# Obs 2,535   2,535  2,535  
Note. Variables defined in Panel C of Table 1. Wald1 records the p-value of the Wald test for the joint 
exclusion of year effects. Wald2 records the p-value of the Wald test for the joint exclusion of industry 
effects. Colum 1 reports estimation results based on a dynamic logit specification, while columns 2 and 3 
report estimation results based on a dynamic multinomial logit specification. All estimation are performed 
by using the method of quasi maximum likelihood with robust standard errors. Adj. R2 is the adjusted 
McFadden’s R-squared values for the dynamic logit and multinomial logit models. The reported estimates 
are estimates of the corresponding marginal effects of each regression.  The asterisks *, **, and *** 
respectively denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels for two-sided alternatives. 
 
Table 5. Virtuous Cycle of Positive Reciprocity (H3) 
 
  H3a: H3b: H3c 
  Dep Var: Conit Dep Var: ITCit Dep Var: SPro+Sit 
SPro|Sit-1 0.335 (0.169) **     
SYSvOCCit -1   0.056 (0.028)  ** 0.317 (0.) *** 
Conit-1   0.152 (0.055)  ***   
SIZEit-1   0.138 (0.069)  **   
ROAit-1   0.097 (0.044)   **   
MVit-1   0.066 (0.038) *   
CRit  0.141 (0.066) **   0.172 (0.) ** 
TQit 0.078 (0.029) ***   0.264 (0.) ** 
Industry Included  Included  Included  
Year Included  Included  Included  
       
System Ln L     -1455.8   
Wald1     0.000  
Wald2     0.000  
# Obs     6,814  
Note. Variables Defined in Panel C of Table 1. Estimation of the model is performed by using full 
information maximum likelihood to the system of three linear simultaneous equations. Wald1 records the 
p-value of the Wald test for the joint exclusion of year effects in the system. Wald2 records the p-value of 
the Wald test for the joint exclusion of industry effects in the system. The asterisks *, **, and *** 
respectively denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels for two-sided alternatives. 
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Table 6. Robustness Checks: H1a & H1b 
 Dep.Var:  SYSit v. OCCit  Dep.Var:  OCCit v. NonITCit 
 Coeff.(std.) Sig. Coeff.(std.) Sig. Coeff.(std.) Sig.  Coeff.(std.
) 
Sig
. 
Coeff.(std.) Sig. Coeff.(std.) Sig. 
SYS it-1 v. 
OCCit-1 
0.220 
(0.089) 
** 0.239 
(0.104) 
** 0.227 (0.) ** OCC v. 
NonITCit-1 
0.111 
(0.067) 
* 0.139 
0.084) 
* 0.121 
(0.073) 
* 
SP1it-1 0.105 
(0.052) 
**     SP1it-1 0.045 
(0.023) 
*     
SP2it-1   0.127 
(0.049) 
***   SP2it-1   0.071 
0.043) 
*   
SP3it-1     0.109 
(0.046) 
** SP3it-1     0.065 
(0.038) 
* 
CumITexp
it-1 
0.257 
(0.130) 
** 0.316 
(0.150) 
** 0.298 
(0.128) 
** CumITexpit
-1 
0.083 
(0.043) 
* 0.128 
(0.066) 
* 0.105 
(0.055) 
* 
SIZEit-1 0.085 
(0.045) 
* 0.114 
(0.057) 
** 0.101 
(0.052) 
* SIZEit-1 0.087 
(0.048) 
* 0.113 
(0.068) 
* 0.106 
(0.062) 
* 
ROAit-1 0.041 
(0.024) 
* 0.043 
(0.023) 
* 0.037 
(0.019) 
* ROAit-1 0.051 
(0.031) 
* 0.044 
(0.026) 
* 0.037 
(0.022) 
* 
MVit-1 0.035 
(0.022) 
 0.036 
(0.018) 
* 0.039 
(0.020) 
* MVit-1 0.065 
(0.047) 
 0.053 
(0.033) 
* 0.048 
(0.026) 
* 
SYS i0 v. 
OCCi0 
0.326 
(0.155) 
** 0.312 
(0.153) 
** 0.322 
(0.149) 
** OCC v. 
NonITCi0 
0.325 
(0.155) 
** 0.315 
(0.159) 
** 0.320 
(0.162) 
** 
 Industry Included   Included   Included   Industry Included   Included   Included  
 Year Included   Included   Included   Year Included   Included   Included  
  
0.292 
(0.116) 
** 0.283 
(0.123) 
** 0.289 
(0.126) 
** 
  
0.371 
(0.160) 
** 0.352 
(0.175) 
** 0.361 
(0.183) 
** 
 Ln L -1061.2    -1013.7    -1042.2   Ln L -1365.1    -1258.0    -1289.7  
 Wald1 0.033 ** 0.032 ** 0.035 **  Wald1 0.034 ** 0.025 ** 0.028 ** 
 Wald2 0.045 ** 0.040 ** 0.043 **  Wald2 0.045 ** 0.037 ** 0.039 ** 
# Obs 971  971  971  # Obs 3,065  3,065  3,065  
Note. Variables Defined in Panel C of Table 1. Wald1 records the p-value of the Wald test for the joint exclusion of year effects. Wald2 records 
the p-value of the Wald test for the joint exclusion of industry effects. The asterisks *, **, and *** respectively denote significance at the 10, 5 and 
1% levels for two-sided alternatives. 
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Table 7. Robustness Checks: H2b 
 Dep.Var:  SPro|SNCit Dep.Var:  WPro|SNCit 
 Coeff.(std.) Sig. Coeff.(std.) Sig. 
CRit 0.132 (0.052) ** 0.149 (0.071) ** 
TQit 0.215 (0.079) *** 0.233 (0.089) *** 
ITC_hatit 0.311 (0.135) ** 0.325 (0.127) ** 
Industry Included   Included  
Year Included   Included  
Adj. R2 0.61  0.68  
# Obs 2,535  2,535  
Note. Variables defined in Panel C of Table 1. Wald1 records the p-value of the Wald test for the joint 
exclusion of year effects. Wald2 records the p-value of the Wald test for the joint exclusion of industry 
effects. Colum 1 reports estimation results based on a dynamic logit specification, while columns 2 and 3 
report estimation results based on a dynamic multinomial logit specification. All estimation are performed 
by using the method of quasi maximum likelihood with robust standard errors. Adj. R2 is the adjusted 
McFadden’s R-squared values for the dynamic logit and multinomial logit models. The reported estimates 
are estimates of the corresponding marginal effects of each regression.  The asterisks *, **, and *** 
respectively denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels for two-sided alternatives 
 
 
Table 8. Robustness Checks: H3a, H3b, & H3c 
 
  H3a: H3b: H3c 
  Dep Var: Conit Dep Var: SYSvOCCit Dep Var: SPro+Sit 
SPro|Sit-1 0.318 (0.) **     
SYSvOCCit -1   0.116 (0.055) ** 0.232 (0.116) ** 
Conit-1   0.083 (0.042)  **   
SIZEit-1   0.102 (0.048)  **   
ROAit-1   0.078 (0.047)   *   
MVit-1   0.055 (0.033) *   
CRit  0.139 (0.) **   0.127 (0.061) ** 
TQit 0.085 (0.) ***   0.252 (0.081) *** 
Industry Included  Included  Included  
Year Included  Included  Included  
       
System Ln L     -1516.2   
Wald1     0.000  
Wald2     0.000  
# Obs     6,814  
Note. Variables Defined in Panel C of Table 1. Estimation of the model is performed by using full 
information maximum likelihood to the system of three linear simultaneous equations. Wald1 records the 
p-value of the Wald test for the joint exclusion of year effects in the system. Wald2 records the p-value of 
the Wald test for the joint exclusion of industry effects in the system. The asterisks *, **, and *** 
respectively denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels for two-sided alternatives. 
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Appendix A – Examples of sITes and their classification according to their title(s) 
 
Examples of sITes classified as CIOplus: 
1. Mr. Robert B. Carter has been Executive Vice President and Chief Information Officer at 
FedEx Corporation since June 2000. Mr. Carter is responsible for its key applications and 
technology infrastructure. He has held numerous positions within the company since 1993 and 
most recently he served as Corporate Vice President and Chief Technology Officer. Mr. 
Carter has received numerous awards and honors, including CIO Magazine's “20/20 Vision 
Award” in 2002. Mr. Carter earned his MBA. from the University of South Florida and his 
Bachelor’s degree in Computer and Information Sciences from the University of Florida. 
2. Mr. Baskaran Iyer is currently Vice President and Chief Information Officer (CIO) of 
Honeywell International and has been with the company since 2000. Prior to joining Honeywell, 
he was CIO for GlaxoSmithKline and Manager of Systems and Programming at Johnson & 
Johnson. In February 2011, he was honoured as one of IDG Computerworld’s 2011 Premier IT 
Leaders. Mr. Iyer earned a BSc in Mechanical Engineering from Annamalai University and a 
MSc in Computer Science from the Florida Institute of Technology. 
 
Examples of sITes classified as CIO: 
1. Mr. Steve Randich has been the Chief Information Officer for Citigroup since 2005. Before 
joining Citigroup, Mr. Randich came from Nasdaq Stock Market where he started as Chief 
Technology Officer and later became Chief Information Office. Prior to that, he has been with 
IBM and the Chicago Stock Exchange. Mr. Randich Attended Northern Illinois University and 
graduated with a Bachelor of Science in Computer Science. 
2. Mr. Thaddeus is the Chief Information Officer of AT&T since 2007. He joined the company in 
2001 as CIO of Cingular Wireless (now AT&T Mobility LLC). Prior to his appointment at 
AT&T, Thaddeus worked for Sabre Corporation with multiple positions such as Senior Vice 
President of Information Technology Services. He has also won many awards and honours 
such as the 2007 CIO 100 Award and 2002 Georgia Global CIO of the year Award. Information 
Week has recognized AT&T as one of the Top 500 companies twelve years in a row from 1997 
to 2009 with the exception of 2004. Under Thaddeus’ leadership, the company was recognized by 
the IW500 three years from 2007 to 2010. Thaddeus holds a Bachelor of Arts in Mathematics for 
the University of Texas at Arlington. 
Examples of sITes classified as Non-CIOs: 
1. Mrs. Padmasree Warrior has been Chief Technology Officer (CTO) for Cisco Systems since 
2007. Prior to this position, she has held been CTO for various companies such as Motorola, and 
Semiconductor Products Sector. In 2007, she was also awarded with a Doctor of Engineering 
from New York’s Polytechnic University and inducted into the Women in Information 
Technology International Hall of Fame. Mrs. Warrior holds a bachelor’s degree in Chemical 
Engineering from the Indian Institute of Technology. 
2. Mr. Marc Gordon joined the Bank of America in 2004 and is currently the Chief Technology 
Officer. Prior to this position, Mr. Gordon has held various IT level positions with companies 
such as Accenture, West Marine, and Best Buy. Mr. Gordon holds a BA in Economics from 
Colby College and an MBA in Information Systems from the Sloan School of Management at 
MIT. 
 
 
